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 Executive Summary 
 
  This paper examines the European Commission’s (EC) Better Regulation Agenda, from 
the time that President Barroso came to power – in November 2004 – to the 2006 summer recess.  
It particularly focuses on whether the Commission’s regulatory thinking has moved away from 
the precautionary principle and towards Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), something I 
predicted in 2004 (Lofstedt 2004).  The article summarizes the papers and communications in the 
Better Regulation area put forward by the Commission since November 2004, and makes a 
number of observations about how the Better Regulation Agenda may develop in the future.  In 
conclusion I argue that the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda has plateaued.   
Commissioner Verheugen will not be successful in pushing the Agenda further forward because 
of issues such as REACH and opposition from member states, notably France.  It is based on a 
combination of desk research and interviews with policy-makers, regulators, academics and 
stakeholders who have been involved either in shaping or fighting the Better Regulation Agenda. 
 
 1 
The Plateau-ing of the European Better Regulation Agenda: 







  Of late, there has been much lip service paid in Europe to better regulation.  That is to say 
that Commission officials have argued that Europe’s regulation needs to be improved in order to 
increase Europe’s competitiveness.  A recent Commission Communication noted that less red 
tape leads to more growth (European Commission 2005a).  The aim of this paper is twofold: 
firstly, to provide a summary of what the Commission has been doing in the Better Regulation 
area over the past couple of years (sections 3 to 5): secondly, to analyze the Commission’s work 
and put forward a number of speculations of where the Commission will go next (sections 6-8).  
The paper ends on a rather pessimistic note, namely that the Better Regulation Agenda has 
plateau-ed and the future of it does not look bright, because of pending regulations – such as 
REACH – as well as member-state opposition to it (from France, for example).  In so doing, the 
paper questions a prevailing European mind-set, namely that the Commission will be 




  On the 22nd of November 2004, Barroso and his 24 Commissioners came into power.  
With regard to the Better Regulation Agenda, the timing was crucial.  The previous Prodi 
Commission had begun wrestling with the topic following the much-heralded June 2002 Better 
Regulation package, which among other things stipulated the use of RIAs for all proposed 
regulations (e.g. European Commission 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2002d).  This package – and, 
historically, Europe’s Better Regulation Agenda in general – was driven by three concerns:  good 
governance, sustainable development, and competitiveness (for a detailed discussion see Lofstedt 
2004).  
  At the time, however, there was arguably no clear and consistent way forward for Better 
Regulation.  The Commission itself was struggling both in ensuring public and stakeholder 2 
participation, attempting to promote social and environmental concerns raised in the European 
Council of Gothenburg while at the same time arguing for greater European Union (EU) 
competitiveness.  Initially, a number of key members within the Commission believed that these 
various elements could work in harmony: by focusing on social and environmental values, EU 
competitiveness could be increased. This was something that had been postulated not only by a 
number of academics – most notably Porter and Weale – but, more importantly, by Minna 
Gillberg, who had written her PhD on this topic (Gillberg 1999)
1 and was a close advisor to 
Commissioner Margot Wallstrom (the Commissioner for the Environment DG).  
  But there was also significant opposition to the Better Regulation Agenda, as voiced by a 
number of EC Directorates-General (DGs), as well as by certain Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) (e.g. Schorling 2002) and environmental Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs).  These stakeholders felt that it threatened the further use of the precautionary principle 
and that there was too much focus on the economics of regulation, rather than on environmental 
and social values.  The timing of the Better Regulation package was difficult.  It was published at 
a time when there had been a number of Communications, White Papers and court rulings, which 
not only postulated the further use of the precautionary principle, but in effect legalized it 
(Lofstedt 2004; Marchant and Mossman 2004; Scott and Vos 2002; Van Asselt 2005; Van Asselt 
and Vos 2006).
2  At the time, the Commission was generally seen as left-of-centre.  The 
President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, was a former governor of the Bank of Italy, with 
left-of-centre sentiments, and the Commissioner for DG Environment – and main driver of 
REACH (the proposed European chemical-control policy) – was Wallstrom, a Swedish Socialist.  
  At the same time, discussions surrounding the European Better Regulation Agenda began 
receiving transatlantic attention.  Academics in the United States (US) were analyzing the 
European use of the precautionary principle (Graham and Hsia 2002; Hammitt et al. 2005; 
Sunstein 2002 and 2005; Tickner 2003; Vig and Faure 2004; Vogel 2003; Wiener 2002; Wiener 
2003; Wiener and Rogers 2002), and a war of words began between American and European 
politicians regarding the European use of the term.  Prof. John Graham – then Director of the US 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) – went on record as saying “we consider [the precautionary principle] to be a mythical 
                                                           
1 Minna Gillberg is now a member of Commissioner Wallstrom’s cabinet. 
2 These included the European Commission’s Chemical White Paper (European Commission 2001) and the much-
discussed European Court of First Instance case of Pfizer Animal Health vs European Commission.  3 
concept, perhaps like a unicorn” (Graham 2002).  In turn, the concept was vigorously defended 
by the European Environment Agency (EEA), which showed, in one highly-publicized study, 
that the precautionary principle saved lives and helped the environment (EEA 2001).  The debate 
became rather vociferous at times, leading Wallstrom to go on the charm offensive to defend the 
European use of the precautionary principle in the United States and elsewhere (e.g. Wallstrom 
2002). 
 
3. Better Regulation Today
 
  Much has changed since then, however.  The Barroso Commission is fundamentally a 
different beast from the Prodi administration.  It is right-of-centre and free-market oriented, in 
the Anglo-Saxon model, with a number of appointments and internal moves made to signify this.  
For example, responsibility for REACH moved from DG Environment to DG Enterprise, where 
the new Commissioner, Gunter Verheugen (also a Vice President of the Commission), has 
attempted to make it more palatable for (German) industry. The new Commissioner for DG 
Environment is Stavros Dimas, a Greek Christian Democrat who arguably has a weaker mandate 
in comparison to his predecessor, and is thus less able to influence the shaping of the 
environmental political agenda (Institute for European Environmental Policy 2006).  Finally, 
within the new Commission, Wallstrom was moved from DG Environment and made 
Commissioner for Communications and Vice President, which has in effect sidelined her from 
any further participation in the development of REACH.  This has led to an occasional skirmish 
between Wallstrom and her colleagues in the Commission, such as when she challenged Barroso 
for putting forward a ‘Room Paper’ on REACH, which had been watered down even further than 
the compromise text agreed upon in the Commission during the UK presidency (McLauchlin 
2005b). By far the most powerful Commissioner in the Barroso Commission is Verheugen.   
Because of him DG Enterprise has transformed itself over recent years and now has a strong 
Better Regulation Agenda. Although he is a personal friend of the former German Chancellor, 
Gerhard Schröder, and a socialist by background, his friends and enemies see him very much in 
the New Labour mould, if not as a centre-right politician.  In one of his first speeches after 
becoming Vice President of the Commission he stated: 
 4 
Cutting red tape will be my trademark. Reducing red tape, removing unnecessary 
restrictions, screening the existing legislation – whether or not we still need it, whether 
we can simplify it…. We should not bring forward legislation without proper impact 
assessment.  (Verheugen 2004) 
 
  But questions remain, concerning how the Better Regulation Agenda has been affected 
by the Barroso Commission and what the consequences of this are for future regulation both 




3.1 Better Regulation is being streamlined 
  Since its introduction, the Commission’s various Better Regulation initiatives have been 
strongly criticized (Institute for European Environmental Policy 2004; Lee and Kirkpatrick 2004; 
Mather and Vibert 2005; Torriti 2006; Vibert 2004).  Some critics take the view that the 
Commission initially tried to conduct too many RIAs, and as a result the quality of them was at 
best mixed (Ambler et al. 2003; 2004a; 2004b; 2005).  Others argue that the consultants hired by 
both the Commission and other interest groups do not have adequate experience of conducting 
risk assessments.  For example, with regard to REACH, there have been 36 RIAs to date, with 
the costs (depending on the funder) running as high as 6.7% of Germany’s GNP and 1.735m job 
losses (Arthur D. Little 2002), and the benefits assessed as being anywhere between 50bn Euros 
(World Wildlife Fund for Nature) and 95bn Euros (Greenpeace), saving everything from Eskimo 
children to polar bears.
3 To summarize, the RIAs conducted for REACH have been used as 
lobby instruments and are not unbiased measures of the actual costs and benefits, something 
noted by the European Parliament in its criticism of Arthur D. Little’s RIA work for the German 
Industry Association (BDI).    
  The European Commission has acknowledged these criticisms and over recent years has 
begun to address them.  It has done so in two ways: via top-down, policy-driven 
Communications on the topic, and via practical guidelines and sharing of best practice. 
 
                                                           
3 The Commission’s RIA showed that the costs for industry abiding by the new REACH regulations ranges from 
2.6bn to 5.2bn Euros over 11 years, representing 0.05%-0.1% of the annual turnover of the chemical sector. 5 
3.2 Top-down, policy-driven Communications
 
  The Barroso Commission has issued a number of top-down, policy-driven 
Communications (European Commission 2005a; 2005c; 2005d; 2005e; 2005f; 2005g).  A key 
focus was the issue of competitiveness (as part of the Lisbon Goal), particularly the role Better 
Regulation could play to help increase competitiveness and reduce regulatory burdens and red 
tape.  Verheugen takes the view that the Better Regulation Agenda should be based on three 
‘pillars’.  In one speech on the topic he said: 
 
First we will withdraw more than a third of the proposals pending in the Council and 
Parliament since at least 2004…. Secondly, we will simplify existing legislation…. 
Thirdly, we will only present proposals for new legislation that have undergone impact 
assessment including a competitiveness test. (Verheugen 2005d) 
 
  These so-called ‘pillars’ are also apparent in the various communications and initiatives 
proposed by the Commission over the past few years: 
 
•  Improving and extending the use of impact assessments (European Commission 2005a).  One 
way to achieve this would be via uniform Impact Assessment guidelines. 
•  Developing a methodology to measure administrative costs (European Commission 2005f).  
Along with a number of member states, most notably the Netherlands and the UK (Better 
Regulation Task Force 2005; OECD 2005), the Commission takes the view that 
administrative burdens (that is demonstrating compliance, inspection, form-filling, record-
keeping) could be significantly reduced.  Unlike the UK, which has adopted a horizontal 
analysis in determining administrative burdens, the Commission has adopted a horizontal 
sector-by-sector approach, with an initial focus on automotive, construction and waste 
sectors. 
•  The screening of legislative proposals (European Commission 2005c).  In September 2005, 
Barroso’s Commission, following the first extensive screening of 489 pending proposals, 
scrapped 67 pending EU laws, seen as outdated and unnecessary. 
 
  The biggest challenge regarding Better Regulation, however, was the October 2005 
communication entitled Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: A strategy for the 
simplification of the regulatory environment (European Commission 2005g).  This highly 6 
ambitious document has as a first step the review of some 220 areas of legislation, involving 
more than 1400 related legal acts.   
  The Commission sees the simplification as being necessary because small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for 99 per cent of all enterprises and 75 per cent of 
Europe’s workforce: 
 
… suffer disproportionately from legislative and administrative burdens as they have 
more limited resources and expertise to tackle often complex rules and regulations.  It is 
therefore necessary to assess how their special needs can be taken into consideration in 
the context of simplification. (European Commission 2005g) 
 
  Finally, the Commission realizes that, whatever it does in this area, there will be no 
measurable results unless member states follow the Commission’s initiatives.  It is clearly 
worried about how member states will handle Better Regulation initiatives: 
 
It is also quite clear, however, that better regulation will be possible if only the Member 
States also play their part, since it is the Member States that are responsible for many of 
the regulations that hamper competitiveness.  According to a British study, 80% of the 
red tape encumbering the European economy does not come from Brussels but from the 
capitals — quite simply because EU Directives are implemented in an unnecessarily 
bureaucratic fashion. (Verheugen 2005a) 
 
  To address this, the Commission proposes that, firstly, Better Regulation agencies are 
established in all member states, like those already in place in Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.  Secondly, the Commission is considering using ‘Regulations’ 
in the future,
4 rather than Directives,
5 for the implementation of EU-based regulations, thereby 
reducing the chances of member states ‘gold-plating’ the regulations.
6  Finally, the Commission 
is considering introducing so-called ‘sunset clauses’ that will limit how long the 
Regulations/Directives will be in force (European Commission 2005g).  
 
                                                           
4 Regulations are binding laws that are narrowly defined and must be implemented by the member states as is. 
5 Directives are binding laws in terms of their objectives and goals, but crucially, unlike the regulations, the member 
states themselves are allowed to decide how to best reach the objectives and goals. 
6 Gold-plating refers to when the implementation goes beyond the minimum necessary to comply with an EU 
Directive by either extending the scope, substituting wider legal terms for those used in the Directive, or not taking 
full advantage of derogations within the Directive to keep requirements to a minimum. 7 
3.3 Practical guidelines and sharing of best practice
 
  The top-down policy initiatives put forward by the Commission in its Communications 
have led to the development of a series of practical guidelines and encouraged interest in sharing 
best regulation practice among policy makers.  In 2004, the Commission argued for the 
development of five-page ‘Roadmaps’, which have now replaced the Preliminary Impact 
Assessments introduced in 2002.  These Roadmaps call for an estimation of the time required for 
completing the full Impact Analysis (IA), as well as identification of the likely impacts of each 
of the policy options (European Commission SEC 2004 1377).  In June 2005, the Commission 
published its revised Impact Assessment Guidelines, devised to help Commission officials to 
develop uniform impact assessments (European Commission 2005b).  Similarly, DG SANCO 
recently put forward Guidelines for the Preparation of a SANCO Scoping Paper, which aims to 
assist its civil servants develop the background documentation needed for any new regulatory 
initiatives that will need approval by the Commissioner, and other planning documents such as 
Roadmaps (DG SANCO 2005a). Similarly, in 2005, the Commission set up a High Level group 
of national experts on Better Regulation and is in the process of establishing an electronic 
network of specialists and experts who can be called upon to give advice of a technical and 
scientific nature in the elaboration of the Commission’s Impact Assessments. 
  Since Barroso came to power, the Commission has paid closer attention to the ongoing 
work on impact assessment and cost benefit analysis originating in the US.  For example, the 
most senior Bush appointee working on this topic, Prof. John D Graham, who was rather 
unwelcome among Commission officials (most notably DG Environment) and MEPs during the 
Prodi era, is well received by Barroso, Verheugen and colleagues.  Over the past two years, 
Graham has been invited to teach on Better Regulation courses set up by DG SANCO as well as 
on training days for regulators in the new member states, arranged by the European Policy 
Centre, a Brussels-based think-tank.  In 2005, based on his initiative, OMB, together with DG 
Enterprise and the Secretariat General, established a high level US/Europe summit on Better 
Regulation, and since then there have been a number of summits in both Brussels and 
Washington, with a high level of interest from senior regulators on both sides of the Atlantic 
(EU-US Economic Initiative 2005).  These dialogues are bound to receive even greater interest 
following the recent appointment of C. Boyden Gray as the US ambassador to the European 
Union, who has a personal interest in the Better Regulation agenda.  8 
3.4 Research and actual improvements
  Aside from the top-down and practical initiatives, the Commission has attempted to 
address criticism by hiring more staff to work on Better Regulation issues, and has 
commissioned academic research in this area.  Over the past two years, for example, a number of 
DGs have increased their ability to carry out and review RIAs.  While the Secretariat General 
continues to take the lead on the Commission’s Better Regulation activities, DG Enterprise now 
also has a whole unit working on Better Regulation issues.  DG SANCO and DG Environment 
have also increased their expertise in this area, and other DGs are following suit.  The number of 
‘extensive’ impact analyses is also increasing: in 2001, there were 21 extended impact analyses; 
by 2005 this had almost doubled, to 38. 
  Similarly, both DG Research and DG Enterprise are commissioning academic research in 
the Better Regulation area.  This research has focused on both evaluating RIAs themselves via 
independent scientific peer review, and on providing external overviews of how the Better 
Regulation Agenda should, and should not, be formulated.  Through these research efforts, 
scholastic and primarily economic-based power houses have become established at universities 
such as Exeter and Manchester, and academics such as Jacques Pelkmans and Claudio Radaelli 
have become familiar names in the corridors of DG Enterprise (e.g. Pelkmans et al. 2000; 
Radaelli 2004a; 2004b; 2005).  Their research joins the rich vein of European regulatory studies 
long associated with Majone (Majone 1990; 1996; 2005; 2006).  Finally, think tanks are keen to 
book their seats on this increasingly lucrative band-wagon. The European Policy Centre has a 
Better Regulation Programme (along with its already existing Risk Forum), and the Centre for 
European Policy Studies has established its Regulatory Affairs Programme (e.g. see a study by 
Renda 2006). 
 
4. Competitiveness—the Main Driver of the Better Regulation Agenda
 
  The Commission’s interest in so heavily promoting the Better Regulation Agenda is 
linked with Verheugen and his colleagues’ interest in increasing Europe’s competitiveness 
(Verheugen 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2005e; 2005f).  In reviewing the Commission’s 
Communication on Better Regulation and related themes, competitiveness is repeatedly raised as 
an issue.  Verheugen and his colleagues take the view that ‘Lisbon = competitiveness’, and that 9 
this is achieved through Better Regulation – end of story.  Hence, the much-touted three 
components of better regulation – good governance, competitiveness and sustainable 
development – have been reduced to one: competitiveness.
7  Verheugen, for example, argued in 
a much-quoted Better Regulation speech: 
 
Better regulation at all levels constitutes a central component in the Commission’s 
proposal for revitalising the Lisbon process.  The equation is simple: Less red tape = 
more growth and jobs.  Today we have presented a specific package of measures for 
cutting down on red tape with a view of improving the environment for business and 
industry and hence strengthening the competitiveness of the EU economy. (Verheugen 
2005a) 
 
  Neither sustainable development nor good governance measures were mentioned in this 




  Vocal elements of the Commission (DG Enterprise) take the view that it already 
addresses the governance issue, as the Commission is more transparent and more open to public 
and stakeholder involvement than it ever has been (e.g. the highly publicised internet 
consultations that have been used repeatedly by the Commission over recent years, such as those 
used during the REACH consultation [Donkers 2006]).  This is not a widely held view outside 
the Commission.  The consumers NGO, BEUC, takes the view that the Commission, and in 
particular DG Enterprise, is not nearly transparent enough (Murray 2006), while others, such as 
UK’s Better Regulation Task Force (now the Better Regulation Commission), argue that the 
Commission’s consultation period is simply too short (Better Regulation Task Force 2005b).  For 
example, at the UK presidency’s Better Regulation Conference in September 2005, Sir David 
Arculus, Chair of the Better Regulation Task Force, argued: 
 
… there is also a lack of transparency in the Commission’s reluctance to disclose how 
fully it is meeting its own standards for consultation.  Reporting at the moment can be 
perfunctory, selective and superficial, and we discovered that almost a quarter of recent 
Commission consultations lasted for less than its own eight-week minimum standard, and 
the Commission didn’t report this statistic itself.  So citizens have a right to know how 
                                                           
7 One needs to note, however, that the impact assessments are neutral Better Regulation tools.  These IAs continue 
to be applied in an integrated matter to assess impacts across all three dimensions, with the aim to present the 
evidence to the politicians to decide on whether and how to best proceed. 10 
well the Commission is performing the tasks it set itself, and this is not just about 
efficiency and effectiveness, but also about accountability. (Arculus 2005) 
 
  The Commission disagrees.  Verheugen, for example, argued at the same UK regulation 
meeting that: 
 
As far as the consultation is concerned, I don’t share fully your views, Sir David.  I think 
that we are already over-consulting in the European Union, but I accept that we certainly 
can improve the transparency of the consultation process.  Since we have the Internet it is 
more or less impossible to take into account everything that we get from stakeholders.  In 
the case of REACH for instance, we got 40,000 responses during the consultation 
process, and that is something that must be discussed, but I would like to discuss that 
with Member States and the Parliament. (Verheugen 2005) 
 
  The debate regarding whether the Commission is adhering to ‘good governance’ is not 
about to go away.  Recently, for example, Verheugen set up the Cars 21 group, to examine what 
regulation aimed at the automotive sector would look like over the next few years.  With regard 
to this group, environmentalists and consumers took the view that they were under-represented.  
Similarly, in February 2006, European Parliamentarians attacked Verheugen’s high-level 
advisory group on energy as unbalanced, as it had two representatives from the nuclear sector, 
yet no one from the renewables area (McLauchlin 2006; Taylor 2006). Verheugen feels that 
these accusations are unfair: 
 
I could have sat with industry representatives behind closed doors and no one would have 
said anything.  I deliberately decided not to do this but to launch a round table with all the 
stakeholders to achieve a balance between what the NGOs are asking for and what 
industry CEOs ask for. (McLauchlin 2006) 
 
  That said, within the Commission itself some DGs, most notably Communication, do 
take the view that more dialogue is needed.  Commissioner Margot Wallstrom, for example, 
recently launched the Plan D initiative, which stands for democracy, dialogue and debate.  The 
problem with this initiative in particular – and the DG Communication in general – is that since 
the European Constitution was voted down by the French and the Dutch, and after the revamped 
Lisbon agenda, outside policy observers take the view that Wallstrom and her colleagues have 




  Sustainable development is today viewed by a number of senior Commission figures as 
being equivalent to greater regulation, and hence hampering growth and threatening the success 
of the Lisbon agenda.  This view should come as no surprise: by the time the Barroso 
Commission was being formed, a number of member states, notably Germany and the UK, were 
of the view that the proposed environmental regulatory measures coming from Brussels were out 
of control and unbalanced.  In particular, concern was expressed about the formulation of the 
chemical control regulation, REACH, and in the initial months of the new Commission there 
were numerous attempts to water down the proposed regulation (Lofstedt 2006).  A number of 
NGOs and Green Party representatives also felt that the Commission was inherently more anti-
environmentally biased than any other.   However, the turning point with regard to taking 
sustainable development out of the Lisbon agenda occurred in early 2005, during the planned re-
launch of the Agenda (commonly referred to Lisbon-2).  In the Better Regulation for Growth and 
Jobs in the European Union Communication, the Commission argues: 
 
The EU’s better regulation policy aims to improve regulation, to better design regulation 
so as to increase the benefits for citizens, and to reinforce the respect and the 
effectiveness of the rules, and to minimise economic costs – in line with the EU’s 
proportionality and subsidiarity principles. (European Commission 2005a) 
 
  In the same Communication the Commission argues that sustainable development is still 
vital: 
Deepening the economic pillar of impact assessment does not compromise the 
importance of ‘sustainable development’ and the integrated approach, which remains the 
basis of the Commission’s approach.  Deepening the economic analysis, which also 
includes competition aspects, should improve the quality of the assessment of the true 
impact of all proposals. (European Commission 2005a) 
 
  In the launch of Lisbon-2, however (and unlike previous communications on the topic), 
the Commission firmly places sustainable development within a set of economic criteria.   
Sustainable development is no longer a stand alone ‘pillar’ – something that critics of the 
Commission have also picked up on.  For example, in a wide ranging and scathing report, the 
think tank Institute for European Environmental Policy takes the view that, with this 
Communication, the Better Regulation Agenda changed shape – from examining a wide array of 12 
possible Better Regulation tools, such as increasing the level of transparency, to a much narrower 
agenda, namely promoting a cost-effectiveness mechanism to increase competitiveness (Institute 
for European Environmental Policy 2005).  
  The inner circles in the Commission deny all this.  Verheugen, for example, has made a 
number of statements disputing these arguments.  In March 2006 he argued: 
 
I do not share the view that trade-offs must be made and that to boost competitiveness 
you have to drop your responsibility to the environment or social standards. (McLauchlin 
2006) 
 
  But there is evidence to support the environmental stakeholders’ claims that the Better 
Regulation Agenda is changing shape.  In July 2005, for example, there was an attempt by DG 
Enterprise to halt DG Environment’s seven core environmental strategies, which focus on 
modernizing and simplifying a number of key regulatory areas, ranging from air pollution to the 
marine environment.  DG Enterprise took the view that rather than simplifying and modernizing 
regulations in these areas, DG Environment’s strategy would actually increase Europe’s 
regulatory burden, and therefore went against the Better Regulation initiative and should be 
halted.  It was only after an unprecedented hearing that Dimas was able to convince fellow 
Commissioners that his plans were in line with the Commission’s Better Regulation initiative.  
His views were substantiated in a Commission document published on the topic in September 
2005 (European Commission 2005d).   
  In December 2005, the Commission published a Communication reviewing its 
sustainable development strategy (European Commission 2005h). It had a bold underlying 
statement, setting out an action plan; but rather than containing concrete, specific actions, the 
Communication was rather vague. For example, the Commission argues: 
 
Governments will always be an important part of the solution as they set the framework 
within which citizens and businesses take decisions.  But, sustainable development 
cannot only be about what governments can do.  All stakeholders, businesses and citizens 
in particular, need to be empowered and encouraged to come up with new and innovative 
ways to address the challenges and seize the opportunities. (European Commission 
2005h) 
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  The document itself was heavily criticised by the green lobby.  For example, John 
Hontelez of the European Environmental Bureau (an NGO) took the view that the strategy 
implied that the Commission: 
 
… basically withdraws as a leader for sustainable development. (ENDS Report 2006) 
 
  The Commission has addressed this and related criticisms by pointing out that at the 
conclusion of the Austrian presidency in June 2006, a strategy will be put forward that will: 
 
Integrate the internal and external dimensions and be based on a positive long-term 
vision, bringing together the Community’s sustainable development priorities and 
objectives in a clear, coherent strategy that can be communicated simply and effectively 
to citizens. (Begg and Larsson 2006) 
 
4.3 The response from the environmental lobby
 
  The environmental lobby, concerned about the de-prioritization of the sustainable 
development pillar, have tried to convince the Commission that its priority needs to be increased.  
For example, the so-called Prague Statement, issued by the heads of Europe’s various 
Environmental Protection Agencies, noted that there was evidence that good environmental 
regulation makes good competitiveness (Network of Heads of European Environment Protection 
Agencies 2005), in line with earlier academic research on the topic (Hajer 1995; Porter 1998; 
Porter and van der Linde 1995; Vogel 1995; Weale 1992 and 1993).  In addition, a number of 
environmental lobby groups – such as the European Panel for Sustainable Development – have 
shown that tough regulation leads to greater competitiveness, rather than the reverse (Begg and 
Larsson 2006; European Panel for Sustainable Development 2005a and 2005b).   
  Member states themselves have also become active in this area.  In January 2006 the 
Dutch Environment Minister Pieter van Geel proposed a five-step plan for cementing eco-
efficiency into the EU Lisbon strategy (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2006).  
Similarly, the Swedish authorities have long argued that tough environmental regulation leads to 
greater competitiveness.  As far back as 1996, their Prime Minister took the view that: 
 
We will gain from… the marriage of ecology, economy and employment.  
(Cabinet Platform, September 17
th, 1996 [Lundqvist 2000]) 
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  And Ethel Forsberg, Director General of the Swedish Chemicals Inspectorate, recently 
argued that: 
 
Green chemistry will lead to new jobs and greater innovation, which will only benefit 
Sweden’s competitiveness. (Forsberg 2006) 
 
  The most vocal proponent arguing that Better Regulation is still synonymous with 
sustainable development is Dimas himself.  In a series of speeches in 2005, (Dimas 2005a; 
2005b; 2005c) he defended the raison d’être of DG Environment, not accepting the agenda 
driven by Verheugen and colleagues.   
  For example, on the misinformation in the Commission and elsewhere: 
 
… the last 12 months have seen the increasing acceptance of the outdated view that 
environmental protection limits growth and costs jobs.  This is misinformation – and  
it’s time to put the record straight.” 
 
… environmental standards drive innovation and contribute to competitiveness.  
(Dimas 2005c) 
 
  And on the problems of ignoring the costs of inaction by not adopting stricter regulations: 
 
  … the cost of inaction can be many times the cost of sensible preventive measures.   
  In the long term, pollution will affect the economy’s bottom line just as much as it  
  affects the quality of people’s lives.  It is therefore up to policy makers not to 
  compromise the environment in the short term (and short sighted) dash for growth. 
 (Dimas  2005c) 
 
  Dimas and his cabinet back up these statements with figures and statistics, arguing that 
Europe’s citizens agree with their position.  For example, he notes that in one Eurobarometer 
survey, 72 per cent of Europe’s citizens took the view that the environment influenced their 
quality of life either “very much” or “quite a lot” – only slightly less than economic factors (78 
per cent).  In addition he points out that in the same poll 63 per cent of citizens agreed that the 








  The European Better Regulation Agenda, as defined by the European Commission, has 
changed direction in a remarkable fashion over the past three years.  RIAs, administrative 
burdens reduction, and regulatory simplification are now all key concepts being promoted by 
Verheugen, Barroso and colleagues,
8 and phrases such as ‘the precautionary principle’ are rarely 
used.  The question that now remains is: what next?  Will this drive continue, or will it 
eventually be watered down?   
 
5.1 The Better Regulation Agenda and the Commission 
 
  On the face of it, it is perhaps surprising that the EU even has a Better Regulation Agenda 
– at least the current one.  Historically, the Commission has never been known for promoting 
regulatory reduction.  In fact, rather the opposite has been the case.  The Commission exists for 
shaping uniform regulations within the EU, and it derives its power from promoting everything 
from environmental regulations to health-and-safety and food legislation.  Indeed, it has been 
noted in a number of contexts that in countries such as the UK more than 50 per cent of 
environmental and health and safety regulations originate from the EU (Lowe and Ward 1998).  
Arguably, if the Commission was serious about promoting Verheugen’s agenda, Commission 
officials would soon be out of a job.  Today, there is a clear sense of unease within the 
Commission itself at middle manager level and below.  Although a majority of the Commission 
officials want to continue to work for the Better Regulation Agenda, a number of Commission 
officials take the view, off-the-record, that it should be promoting the precautionary principle 
much more strongly than it does. The fights between Verheugen and Dimas are also arguably 
reducing the credibility of the Commission.  In their speeches on Better Regulation, it is difficult 
to uncover exactly what the Commission’s policy on the topic is, with Dimas arguing that Better 
Regulation and environmental regulation go hand-in-hand and increase competitiveness, 






                                                           
8 All these Better Regulation initiatives predate the Barroso Commission. 16 
5.2 Better Regulation – just rhetoric?
 
  Better Regulation, just like the Lisbon Agenda, is peppered with much rhetoric and, 
arguably, short on real concrete actions.  The so-called ‘bonfire of regulations’ (European 
Commission 2005) was no more than a housekeeping exercise in the eyes of its critics, since no 
regulations with any substance were removed (McLauchlin 2005; Rasmussen 2005).  Similarly, 
mapping out the costs of administrative burdens does not necessarily mean that they will be 
reduced once the mapping exercise is complete. As countless studies have indicated, it is easier 
to add regulations than to take them away. One only has to look at the history of the UK’s 
deregulation/Better Regulation Agenda, where there has been a history of deregulation and 
Better Regulation initiatives, since the Thatcher government, without a noticeable impact on 
regulatory burdens (Eaglesham 2006; Renda 2006).  Indeed, in the UK at least, regulatory 
burdens have increased over the past twenty years rather than decreased.  The UK Cabinet 
Office’s own review of red tape noted in 2005: 
 
Historically governments have tended to prioritise the creation of new laws over the 
removal of outdated and unnecessary legislation. (Eaglesham 2006; UK Cabinet Office 
2005) 
 
  So it is unclear if the Commission will do any better.  At the end of the day, regulators 
like to regulate.  Promoting tougher regulations gains public trust – the public takes the view that 
the regulators are acting in its best interest – while deregulating increases public distrust – the 
public takes the view that the regulator is captured by industry (Lofstedt 2005).  In a post trust 
era, caused by a number of regulatory scandals such as that surrounding BSE (mad cow disease), 
it is hard to foresee that any regulator, be they EU or member-state based, will reduce 
regulations, as this would be their undoing. 
 
5.3 The Commission and the United States 
 
  To date, the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda has been heavily influenced, 
directly or indirectly (e.g. via the OECD 1997; 2003; 2004), by work being conducted in the 
United States (Lofstedt and Vogel 2001; Majone 2006).  Although there are some differences in 
government structures between the two trade blocks (Radaelli 2004b), measures such as 
separation of risk assessment from risk management, the importance of greater public 17 
participation in the policy-making process, and greater transparency all have their origins in the 
United States (Lofstedt 2003b; Lofstedt and Vogel 2001).  The European Food Safety Authority, 
for example, was modeled on the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and one of the main 
purposes of this body was to regain public trust in food safety legislation, in the wake of the 
BSE/CJD crisis (Alemanno 2006).  The Americans welcome the Commission’s interest in the 
area.  They see it as an opportunity to replace the irrational and non-scientific precautionary 
principle with scientific, evidence-based decision-making.  The transatlantic regulatory summits, 
instigated by Graham and Verheugen, are examples of this co-operation.  The question is 
whether this collaboration will continue. Graham has stepped down from OMB and joined the 
RAND corporation.  The Secretariat General, which should be leading the effort on behalf of the 
Commission, appears to be less than enthusiastic.  The next EU/US steps will depend on whether 
the Commission, or its advisors, believe there are other elements from the US regulatory policy-
making agenda that are worth borrowing.  At present there are four specific regulatory ideas that 
could be of interest to Europe: 
 
•  Establishing an Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the European 
Commission.  Ideally this should be situated in the Secretariat General. The European Policy 
Centre (EPC) introduced this idea in 2001 (Ballantine 2001) and it refuses to go away (e.g. 
Allio et al. 2004; Renda 2006; Wiener 2006) but Commission observers feel that it is not yet 
ready to establish such a body. 
•  Ensuring that all risk assessments used in the making of regulations are scientifically peer-
reviewed to ensure that the risk assessments in question reach a uniform standard across all 
regulatory agencies.  This idea, already raised by a regulatory agency (US EPA 2005), has 
more recently been mooted by the OMB, and is at the time of writing undergoing public 
consultation in the US (OMB 2006).     
•  Developing a European Academy of Sciences, modeled on the US Academy of Sciences.  
This body would have select committees (as the US body has) and would evaluate regulatory 
programs and policy issues which are clouded in scientific uncertainty, and advise policy 
makers on the scientific, state-of-the-art.   The idea, originating from an EPC report 
(Ballantine 2005), has been received positively by DG SANCO, which recently appointed a 
scientific advisor (DG SANCO 2005b). 18 
•    Developing a systematic, science-based decision-making process.  This would involve 
developing greater thinking on risk-risk trade-off issues (Graham and Wiener 1995), ensuring 
that Members of the European Parliament have sufficient scientific advice and that scientific 
regulatory advisory boards are modeled on those in US agencies (e.g. the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Scientific Advisory Board).  These concepts have been discussed by a 
number of think tanks (Ballantine 2003 and 2005) and academics over the past few years 
(Lofstedt 2003b; 2004; Lofstedt and Vogel 2001; Majone 1990 and 1996). 
 
  Of the four topics on the table, it is likely that the Commission will borrow elements from 
at least two of them.  Already DG SANCO, for example, has recognized the importance of risk-
risk trade-offs (DG SANCO 2005b).  The European Parliament is also aware that its scientific 
advisory board, STOA, needs to be reformed.  But most of these measures are piecemeal in 
nature, and implementing them will not necessitate deep US collaboration.  The Commission, in 
principle, will be unwilling to borrow too many ideas from the United States, and does not 
necessarily want to model itself on the US, but on a multitude of different regulatory 
frameworks.  Deeper collaboration, such as transatlantic comparisons in order to improve cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) between the two trade blocks (Hahn and Litan 2005) remains unrealistic.  
The European Commission will continue to favor a much more ‘European’ approach that 
combines CBAs with environmental and social values.    
  Better Regulation is a fashionable topic at moment, driven by a strong economic focus.  
Verheugen sees it as the key to solving the competitiveness issue.  But how long will it remain in 
vogue?  It was fortunate that the two major trade blocks both had centre-right governments at the 
same time, ensuring easy collaboration.  But as with all frameworks, there are both proponents 
and opponents.  Graham and his advisors, for example, have been heavily criticised for adopting 
a tough cost-benefit approach to regulation (Ackerman and Heizerling 2004).  In Europe, the 
Better Regulation Agenda has not been as successful as it could have been.  RIAs are still 
haphazard, regulations are at times based on emotions, not science, and the UK government at 
least remains highly concerned about ‘gold-plating’.
9 The Commission has more staff than ever 
working on Better Regulation, but the task they face must clearly be daunting, and unless more 
                                                           
9 The UK Cabinet Office recently set up a taskforce to examine how many EU regulations over the past few years 
have been gold-plated (UK Cabinet Office 2006). 19 
competent staff are brought on board it is doomed to failure.  It does not help, of course, that it 
still faces a barrage of criticism in the regulation area.  Member state policy-makers still take the 
view that the Commission over-regulates, and studies of the Commission’s own RIAs show 
multiple methodological failures. The Commission is simply not trusted, and member state 
policy-makers attempt to gain public trust by continuing to blame the Commission, justifiably or 
unjustifiably, for domestic regulatory failures.  To date neither regulators nor think tanks or 
academics have gone out of their way to praise the Commission’s efforts.  The majority of those 
praising the Commission’s Better Regulation efforts are Commission officials themselves.
10 
Unless the Commission can point to some clear Better Regulation successes, substantiated by a 
credible, trusted, third-party source, the Better Regulation initiatives (at least as outlined by 
Verheugen) will remain discredited.  It is unfortunate that the implementation of Better 
Regulation initiatives is happening at the same time as the Commission is about to introduce the 
most comprehensive European environmental regulation ever, in REACH.  Although the final 
version of REACH will be substantially milder than that originally advocated by Wallstrom, the 
impact on member state regulators and industries will still be considerable.  The timing for 
Verheugen could not be worse.   
  
5.4 Better Regulation and the member states 
 
  The Commission has noted on a number of occasions that if the Better Regulation 
Agenda is to be successfully implemented, member states will have to follow suit. At present it is 
not clear that this will be the case. Some countries, such as the Netherlands and the UK, are keen 
on promoting Better Regulation Agendas.  Both of these nations, for example, are examining 
how to best reduce administrative burdens (e.g. Better Regulation Task Force 2005a; Radaelli 
2005). Other countries are less keen to do so, most notably France, which is going in the opposite 
direction.  It recently adopted the precautionary principle into the French constitution (Godard 
2003; Godard 2005; Godard 2006; Weill 2005), and policy makers there remain skeptical about 
the Anglo-Saxon Better Regulation construct (Defraigne 2006).  Finally, countries like Sweden 
are very mixed.  On the one hand it is a strong promoter of Better Regulation, actively pushing 
                                                           
10 This, however, is slowly changing.  Some external actors now feel that the Commission is doing a better job than 
before in this area, and rather it is the European Parliament and the European Council that have made slow progress 
in legislating and implementing the Better Regulation measures. 20 
this internally and externally. But it remains utterly precautionary in other areas. For example, it 
decided in 2001 to adopt a toxic-free society whereby all synthetic chemicals will be phased out 
within a generation (Lofstedt 2003a; Swedish Committee on New Guidelines on Chemical 





  Based on the above analysis one can speculate that the EU Better Regulation agenda, at 
least as outlined by Verheugen, has now ‘plateaued’.  There will continue to be some 
housekeeping exercises, removing regulations that will have only a rhetorical effect, with the 
regulatory burden on industry remaining virtually the same. In this regard, the European 
regulatory project (in terms of social regulations) is still following the US model, but with a 20-
year time-lag.  If one looks at the US, after a swathe of tough deregulation initiatives put forward 
by the first Reagan administration, the second Reagan administration and the following Clinton 
and Bush administrations very much distanced themselves from this policy.  Following attempts 
in the early part of the first Reagan administration to roll back environmental regulation, for 
example, a massive public and stakeholder backlash ensued, leading Reagan to recall the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s first administrator, William D Ruckelhaus, in order to re-
establish authority and credibility to the EPA (Andrews 1999; Landy et al. 1994).  Following his 
appointment, alongside that of his deputies, the number of enforcement actions and the size of 
civil penalties imposed rose substantially (Landy et al. 1994).  The same is likely to happen in 
Europe as well.  Europe, with its much shorter regulatory history, cannot simply catch up with 
the US in a period of four years as envisaged by Verheugen.  Rather, the regulatory system in 
Europe will also go through the same trials and tribulations that the Americans did. That is not to 
say that the pendulum will swing back to the precautionary principle as we saw in the Prodi era; 
the pendulum will swing somewhat to the left of where it is at present, ensuring that regulations 
will be developed through a mixture of Better Regulation tools, and emotions, values, politics 
and culture will also play a substantial role.  This is unless, of course, we have another major 
regulatory scandal in the BSE vein, in which case regulators will become risk-averse once again, 21 
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